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I
n this article, we document observations on labor productivity across
countries over time. Using data from Heston, Summers, andAten (2002)
on gross domestic product (GDP) per worker—our measure of labor
productivity—we emphasize three main facts about the distribution of labor
productivity across countries between 1960 and 1996.1 First, there is substan-
tial dispersion in labor productivity across countries. For instance, in 1960
an average worker in the richest 5 percent of countries in the world produces
about 35 times more output than an average worker in the poorest 5 percent
of countries in the world.
Second, disparity in labor productivity has increased over time. By 1996,
thelaborproductivityratiobetweentherichestandpoorestcountriesincreased
to approximately 46. This increase in disparity is explained by a substantial
deteriorationinlaborproductivityinthepoorestcountriesoftheworldrelative
tothatoftheUnitedStates. Wereportseveralstatisticsofdispersionindicating
that labor productivity differences between the richest and poorest countries
have increased since the mid-1980s. This characterization of increased dis-
persion in labor productivity contrasts with a relative stability documented in
previous studies, in which the coverage period ended in 1985.
Third, there is substantial mobility of individual countries in the distribu-
tion of labor productivity over time. For instance, labor productivity in Hong
Kong relative to that in the United States rose from 19 percent in 1960 to 94
percent in 1996—an increase of a factor of almost 5 during the period—while
relative labor productivity in Venezuela declined from 94 percent in 1964 to
36 percent in 1996—a more than twofold drop in relative productivity. We
also document a number of individual episodes of growth and decline. Ac-
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1 Throughout the article, we refer to GDP per worker, output per worker, and labor produc-
tivity interchangeably.
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counting for these speciﬁc labor productivity paths may prove useful not only
from a policy perspective, but also in testing and improving existing theories
of productivity levels or in the development of alternative theories.
This article relates to a large literature on the world distribution of income
that includes Kaldor (1961), Kuznets (1966), Maddison (1995, 2001), Par-
ente and Prescott (1993), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), Jones (1997),
among many others. We contribute to this literature by adding the period
between 1985 and 1996 to the analysis. In addition, we focus on output per
worker as opposed to output per capita since output per worker relates more
directly to theories of labor productivity. The difference between the two
measures is given by the employment-to-population ratio. While there are
substantial differences in these ratios across countries, the differences are not
systematicallyrelatedtodevelopment. Therefore,oursummarystatisticschar-
acterizingoutputperworkerovertimearesimilartostatisticscalculatedusing
output per capita. However, there are substantial changes in employment-to-
population ratios for individual countries over time, and these changes are
not systematically related to development or growth in relative productivity.
Therefore, for an individual country, changes in output per capita can severely
overstate or understate changes in labor productivity.
There are two additional differences between this article and the previous
literature. First, we characterize disparity and mobility using trended data.
That is, we use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to abstract from business-cycle
ﬂuctuationsinthedata. Second,weseektosystematicallyidentifyremarkable
episodes of growth (positive or negative) in the data at some point during
the 1960–1996 period. In the literature, countries facing these episodes are
typically referred to as miracles and disasters. We document 13 miracle and
17 disaster episodes in our data set. Among the miracle episodes, we report
the movement of labor productivity in Botswana relative to that in the United
Statesfrom7percentto30percentin26years; inHongKong,from19percent
to94percentin36years; andinChina,from4percentto8percentin18years.
We also document the recent, but not yet as long, growth episodes of Chile,
Ireland, and India, which may become miracle episodes within the next two
decades.
Furthermore, wealsosystematicallydocumentdepressionepisodesinour
panel data. Ever since the study of the Great Depression in the United States
by Cole and Ohanian (1999), there has been substantial interest in studying
depression episodes (deﬁned broadly as periods of lower-than-usual relative
productivity).2 We follow this literature in characterizing depression episodes
by using the raw data on output per worker relative to a trend growth of
2 This marked interest is reﬂected, for instance, in the work of Prescott (2002) and in several
articles published in a special volume of the Review of Economic Dynamics edited by T. Kehoe
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2 percent per year. Even in our relatively small sample period, we ﬁnd that
depressionsarequitecommon,bothamongrichandpoorcountries. Wereport
29 depression episodes in Section 4.
Our study also relates to a broad literature on models that seek to explain
developmentfactssuchasthoseofdisparityandmobilitydiscussedabove. For
excellent surveys of this literature see, for instance, Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-
Clare (1997) and Caselli (2005). Our study complements this literature by
expanding and updating the set of facts that theories of development should
be able to explain.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe in
detail the data we use for the analysis. Section 2 documents the main facts
about dispersion and mobility in the distribution of labor productivity. In
Section 3, we discuss the remarkable episodes of growth during the period,
namely miracle and disaster episodes, and in Section 4, we document the
episodes of depressions. Section 5 discusses our main ﬁndings relative to
those using instead output per hour, an alternative sample of countries, and
output per capita. We conclude in Section 6.
1. DATA
We focus on output per worker as our measure of labor productivity. We use
annual data on PPP-adjusted GDP per worker in chained 1996 prices obtained
fromHestonetal. (2002),alsoknownasthePennWorldTableV6.1(PWT6.1).
We choose the PWT6.1 for our analysis because it is the most comprehensive
source of comparable measures of output per worker across countries.
We focus on output per worker in order to emphasize the connection of
the data with research on productivity differences across countries. Although
output per hour is a more complete measure of labor productivity, we abstract
from differences in hours per worker across countries due to the lack of sys-
tematicdataforalargenumberofcountriesovertheentireperiodofourstudy.
However, in Section 5, we use the available data on hours per worker to cal-
culate output per hour and discuss our ﬁndings relative to this more complete
measure of labor productivity. Measures of output per capita are appropriate
when the focus is on wealth differences across countries.3 We also discuss
our ﬁndings relative to the use of output per capita in Section 5.
3 Maddison (1995, 2001) documents comparable measures of output per capita for a wide
range of countries and time periods. However, we note that, as in the PWT6.1, Maddison uses
the detailed price data from the International Comparisons Project (ICP) of the United Nations to
calculate purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors at a point in time, and national accounts
data to extrapolate over time. In this sense, Maddison’s output data is comparable to PWT6.1,
especially for the Benchmark countries (see Section 5 for a deﬁnition of Benchmark countries).198 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Our data set consists of annual observations for 99 countries from 1960
to 1996.4 The countries in our data set satisfy two restrictions. First, the total
population of each country was at or above 1 million people in 1996. Second,
data was available at each date from 1960 to 1996. We make this second
restriction in order for the sample of countries to be constant throughout the
period of analysis. Data is available for 48 countries from 1950 to 2000.
However,countrieswithoutobservationsbetween1950and1960andbetween
1996 and 2000 tend to be poorer countries. Thus, the smaller sample from
1950 to 2000 is less representative of the world distribution of output per
worker than our sample with 99 countries from 1960 to 1996.
Indocumentingobservationsaboutdispersion, mobility, andmiraclesand
disasters, we abstract from business-cycle ﬂuctuations and trend the data us-
ing the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.5 Abstracting from business-cycle ﬂuctuations
when reporting development facts is not innocuous. As we document in Sec-
tion 4, countries undergo episodes of substantial growth and decline that are
not entirely related to their development process. To illustrate the cycles in
the annual data, we report in Figure 1 the raw data on output per worker and
the trended data for four countries: the United States, Argentina, Romania,
and Switzerland. As is true with many other countries in our panel data, these
countries have undergone relatively short-lived variations in their output per
worker at different points in time. Our documentation of the development
facts abstracts from these ﬂuctuations.
For the most part, we report statistics on output per worker relative to that
of the United States. Our view is that the United States is a rich, stable, and
diverse country. For most of the period of analysis, the United States had the
highest labor productivity. Moreover, in the post-war period, (trended) labor
productivity grew at roughly 2 percent per year. Therefore, the United States
representsagoodbenchmarkagainstwhichtomeasurepotentialgainsinlabor
productivity in all countries.
2. LABOR PRODUCTIVITYACROSS COUNTRIES
We emphasize three facts about the distribution of labor productivity across
countries. First,thereisalargedisparityinoutputperworkeracrosscountries.
Second, there is a substantial increase in disparity over time. Third, there are
substantial movements of individual countries in the world distribution of
productivity. In the remainder of this section we characterize these facts in
detail.
4 See the Appendix for a list of countries in our data set.
5 We set the smoothing parameter λ equal to 100.M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 199
Figure 1 Output per Worker in Four Countries
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Notes: For each country, the solid line represents the raw data on output per worker and
the dotted-dashed line the HP-trended data.
Disparity
A remarkable fact of modern development data is the large disparity in pro-
ductivity among countries. Here we focus on different measures of disparity
and their evolution between 1960 and 1996.
We start by focusing on the ﬁve richest and ﬁve poorest countries in our
sample. Wecomputetheratioofaverageoutputperworkerfortheﬁverichest
and ﬁve poorest countries for each year from 1960 to 1996, illustrated in
Figure 2. This ratio varies between 35 and 46 over the period of analysis.
That is, the average worker in the richest countries produces between 35 and
46 times more output than the average worker in the poorest countries. These
are remarkable differences in labor productivity.
Thismeasureofdisparityinproductivityacrosscountrieshasbeenroughly
constant from 1960, at 35, until the mid-1980s. The ratio declined slightly
around 1980 but has increased steadily since then to a factor of 46 in 1996.6
6 The ratio of average output per worker for the 5 richest and 5 poorest countries computed
using the data set of 48 countries with data from 1950 to 2000 shows the same pattern as in200 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Output per Worker—Ratio of Five Richest to Five Poorest
Countries












Notes: Between 1960 and 1996, the following countries comprised the ﬁve richest at
some point in time: the United States, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Hong Kong. During the same period, the following
countries comprised the ﬁve poorest countries at some point in time: Tanzania, Guinea
Bissau, Burundi, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This increase in dispersion runs contrary to the established view in the devel-
opment literature that dispersion in the world distribution of productivity has
been rather constant over time (see, for instance, Parente and Prescott 1993;
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 1996). The reason for this view is that until
about 1985 (the end date in most previous studies), the productivity ratio of
the richest to the poorest countries was roughly constant. See Figure 2 where
the line drawn at 1985 emphasizes the connection with the earlier literature.
In Figure 3 we report the relative productivity of the ﬁve poorest and
ﬁve richest countries between 1960 and 1996, each normalized to 100 in
Figure 2. For this data set, the ratio of rich to poor increases steadily from the early 1980s to
2000.M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 201
Figure 3 Relative Output per Worker—Five Richest and Five Poorest
(1960=100)










Notes: Average output per worker relative to the United States for the ﬁve richest and
ﬁve poorest countries. Both series are normalized to 100 in 1960. In 1960, the average
relative output per worker of the ﬁve poorest countries is 2.8 percent, while for the ﬁve
richest countries, it is 99 percent.
1960.7 Thisﬁgureshowsthattheincreaseindispersioninrelativeproductivity
between the richest and poorest countries reported in Figure 2 is mostly due
to the decline in relative productivity of the ﬁve poorest countries. Between
1960 and 1996, relative productivity in the richest countries fell by about 10
percent, while relative productivity in the poorest countries fell by about 30
percent. It is of interest to note that even the ﬁve richest countries declined in
productivity relative to that in the United States. Duarte and Restuccia (2006)
show that the decline in productivity in the richest countries relative to that
in the United States is accounted for by the movement of employment to the
7 In 1960, the average output per worker of the ﬁve poorest countries relative to that of the
United States is 2.8 percent, while the average of the ﬁve richest countries is 99 percent. By
1996, average relative labor productivity is 2 percent in the ﬁve poorest countries and 92 percent
in the ﬁve richest countries.202 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Relative Output per Worker by Decile
1960 1970 1980 1990 1996
Deciles: (percent)
D1 3.4 3.3 3.4 2.8 2.4
D2 6.0 5.8 5.5 4.6 3.7
D3 7.8 7.9 7.7 6.4 5.4
D4 11.0 10.6 12.2 11.4 10.6
D5 16.7 18.1 20.1 17.8 17.4
D6 21.2 22.8 27.8 25.1 23.9
D7 27.2 32.8 34.5 31.7 32.5
D8 38.6 44.1 50.2 48.0 51.0
D9 56.6 65.3 70.2 69.5 72.7
D10 89.6 89.7 88.3 85.2 86.0
Ratios:
D10/D1 26.3 27.1 25.9 30.9 35.6
D9/D2 9.5 11.3 12.7 15.2 19.6
Notes: Decile i (Di) includes countries within the 10×(i −1) and 10×i percent of the
distribution.
service sector (associated with the process of structural transformation) and
the low labor productivity in this sector relative to that in the United States.
We now focus on the entire distribution of labor productivity across coun-
tries. Table 1 reports the average relative output per worker of countries at
each decile of the distribution of countries and for a selected number of years.
The ﬁrst decile includes the 10 percent of countries at the bottom of the dis-
tribution of output per worker, while the tenth decile includes the 10 percent
of countries at the top of the distribution of output per worker. The last two
rows report the ratio of the tenth decile to the ﬁrst and the ratio of the ninth
decile to the second.
In 1960, the poorest 10 percent of countries had an average labor pro-
ductivity of around 3 percent of that of the United States, while the richest
10 percent of countries had an average productivity of 90 percent of that of
the United States, yielding a ratio of 26 between the richest 10 percent to
the poorest 10 percent of countries. In turn, for the same year, the ratio of
productivity for countries in the ninth decile to the second decile is a factor of
almost 10. Note that these ratios increase substantially during our period of
analysis, but especially do so after 1980. Note also that, over time, countries
in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth deciles improved their average relative
productivity(particularlythoseintheeighthandninthdeciles)whilecountries
in the bottom ﬁve deciles and in the top decile had either fallen further behind
or stagnated relative to that of the United States. These patterns indicate that
increasing dispersion in relative labor productivity is occurring not only at the
extremes of the distribution but also in the middle.M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 203
Table 2 Relative Output per Worker by Quintile
1960 1970 1980 1990 1996
Quintiles: (percent)
Q1 4.7 4.5 4.5 3.7 3.1
Q2 9.4 9.3 10.0 8.9 8.0
Q3 19.1 20.7 24.1 21.6 20.8
Q4 34.1 39.9 43.8 41.8 43.8
Q5 74.5 78.7 80.4 78.0 80.0
Ratios:
Q5/Q1 15.8 14.5 18.0 21.3 26.1
Q4/Q2 3.6 4.3 4.4 4.7 5.5
Notes: Quintile i (Qi) includes countries within the 20 × (i − 1) and 20 × i percent of
the distribution.
Disparityinrelativeproductivitybetweenrichandpoorcountriesisappar-
ent even for broader groups of countries. Table 2 reports the average relative
output per worker by quintile. Even when the 20 richest and 20 poorest coun-
tries are averaged, dispersion in labor productivity is large (a ratio of 15.8
between these two sets of countries in 1960 and 26.1 in 1996), and the poorest
countries have lost ground in productivity relative to the richest countries over
time (from 4.7 percent of the United States in 1960 to 3.1 percent in 1996).
The disparity facts we have documented are supported by other summary
statistics of dispersion. The Gini coefﬁcient, for instance, is a commonly used
measure of inequality. We compute the Gini coefﬁcient for each year in our
sample and we ﬁnd that this statistic conﬁrms our earlier ﬁndings.8 The Gini
coefﬁcient was roughly constant (at about 0.49) until the early 1980s and it
has increased since then (to about 0.52 in 1996).
Changes in the dispersion of relative labor productivity over time across
countries suggest movements of individual countries in the distribution of
productivityacrosscountriesovertime. Todocumentthesechanges,wereport
the histogram of the distribution of relative output per worker across countries
at different points in time in Figure 4. The most noticeable change in the
distribution from 1965 to 1995 is the movement of mass from the middle
of the distribution to the right and to the left, creating what the literature
calls “twin peaks” in the world distribution of relative output per worker.9




N2μ , where x is an N × 1
vector with the observations sorted in ascending order and μ is its mean. This coefﬁcient varies
between 0, reﬂecting complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (all income is
concentrated in only one country).
9 See, for instance, Jones (1997).204 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Distribution of Relative Output per Worker




















































Notes: The bins in these histograms are deﬁned as follows: 0 = [0,0.2],0.2 =
[0.2,0.4],0.4 = [0.4,0.6],0.6 = [0.6,0.8],0.8 = [0.8,1.0],and 1 = [1.0,1.2].
Therefore, this statistic also captures an increase in the dispersion of relative
productivity across countries.
We have presented statistics that capture an increase in the dispersion
of labor productivity across countries, especially after the mid-1980s. This
increase is relevant for theories of development because, in these theories,
relativeproductivitylevelsarerelatedtopoliciesandinstitutionalfactorsatthe
country level. We emphasize, however, that the observed increase in disparity
in productivity does not necessarily imply an increase in income inequality in
the world. There are at least three reasons. First, our disparity statistics do
not adjust for changes in the employment-to-population ratios over time and
in the size of population across countries. In particular, improvements in the
standardoflivinginChinaandIndiaalone(aswedocumentlaterinthisarticle)
imply improvements in the standard of living for a sizeable portion of the
population in the world (about 35 percent).10 Second, our disparity statistics
10 See, for instance, Bourguignon and Morrison (2002).M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 205
Table 3 Relative Output per Worker by Region
1960 1970 1980 1990 1996
Asia 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.34
Latin America 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.25
Africa 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12
Western Europe 0.62 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.75
Canada 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.79
Oceania 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.52
do not adjust for inequality within countries. Sala-i-Martin (2006) documents
a reduction in global inequality in income per capita when including within-
country inequality in the analysis. Third, our dispersion statistics do not
capture improvements in broader notions of quantity and quality of life, such
as improvements in life expectancy.11
In this section, we have documented that disparity in relative productivity
across countries is large and that it has increased over the period of analy-
sis. Below, we relate disparity in relative productivity with the geographical
location of countries. We report substantial differences in labor productivity
across regions in the world as well as substantial movements in these regional
differences over time.
Table3reportsaveragesoflaborproductivitybyregionforselectedyears.
For instance, in 1960 the average labor productivity of theAsian countries in
our data set was only 14 percent of that in the United States (about the same
level of relative labor productivity in Africa) and 41 percent of that in Latin
America. By 1996, Asia improved its position relative to that of the United
States to 34 percent, surpassing both Latin America and Africa. On average,
laborproductivityinAfricadidnotimproverelativetothatintheUnitedStates
(at roughly 12 percent). However, as we document below, this is a result of
disparate experiences within Africa, with some countries declining in labor
productivity both in absolute levels and relative to that of the United States,
as well as with countries growing faster than the United States. In contrast,
LatinAmerica declined relative to the United States, from about 34 percent in
1960 to 25 percent in 1996. In the case of LatinAmerica, the common path of
relativelaborproductivitywasoneofdecline, perhapswiththeonlyexception
being Chile, which started rapidly catching up to the United States in 1990.
CountriesinWesternEuropehadarelativeproductivityof62percentin1960,
experienced a period of relative fast gain to 77 percent in 1980, but have since
stagnatedrelativetotheUnitedStatestoaveragelevelsof75percent. Canada,
11 See, for instance, Becker et al. (2005).206 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 4 Mobility Matrix—Relative Output per Worker
t + 20
0-0.075 0.075-0.15 0.15-0.3 0.3-0.6 0.6-1.2
0-0.075 0.86 0.11 0.03 0 0
0.075-0.15 0.38 0.46 0.11 0.05 0
t 0.15-0.30 0.01 0.15 0.57 0.26 0.01
0.3-0.6 0 0.02 0.22 0.48 0.28
0.6-1.2 0 0 0 0.10 0.90
as well as countries in Oceania, had high relative labor productivity in 1960
but slowly declined relative to the United States.
Mobility
Associated with changes in the dispersion of relative labor productivity over
time across countries is a substantial mobility of individual countries in the
distributionofrelativeproductivityovertime. Intheremainderofthissection,
we provide different characterizations of mobility in our data set. In the next
two sections, we focus on individual country experiences.
To start, we characterize mobility in our data through two mobility matri-
ces. The matrix inTable 4 reports the frequency of movements, deﬁned over a
period of 20 years, for relative productivity in our sample. We consider 5 bins
forrelativeproductivity, whichimplyadistributionofcountriesin1960thatis
roughlyuniform. Foreachyearsince1960,weaskhowthepositioninrelative
productivity for a particular country changed in 20 years. Then we average
all the experiences across countries and over time (all the 20-year windows
from 1960 to 1996) in Table 4. For instance, the ﬁrst element of this matrix,
0.86, is the average frequency with which countries with relative productivity
betweenzeroand0.075inagivenyearalsohaverelativeproductivitybetween
zero and 0.075 20 years later.
Mobility in Table 4 (as measured by the off-diagonal elements of the ma-
trix) is higher in the middle of the relative productivity distribution than in its
extremes. The diagonal elements of this matrix are substantially higher for
the poorest countries (with relative productivity between zero and 0.075) and
the richest countries (with relative productivity between 0.6 and 1.2), com-
pared to diagonal elements for the other groups of countries. In addition, note
thatamongmiddle-productivitycountries(thosewithrelativeproductivitybe-
tween 0.075 and 0.6), most improvements in relative productivity in a span of
20 years have occurred for the richer countries in this subset, while most de-
clineshaveoccurredforthepoorercountries. Forinstance, outofallcountries
with relative productivity between 0.075 and 0.15 at some year in our sampleM. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 207
Table 5 Mobility Matrix by Quintile
t + 20
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 0.78 0.21 0.01 0 0
Q2 0.22 0.64 0.11 0.03 0
t Q3 0 0.14 0.62 0.24 0
Q4 0 0.02 0.24 0.58 0.16
Q5 0 0 0 0.16 0.84
Notes: Quintile i (Qi) includes countries within the 20 × (i − 1) and 20 × i percent of
the distribution of relative output per worker.
period, 20 years later, 46 percent of these countries remained in the same rel-
ative productivity bracket and 38 percent declined to a relative productivity
between zero and 0.075. In contrast, for countries with relative productivity
between 0.15 and 0.3, 20 years later, 57 percent remained in the same rela-
tive productivity bracket and 26 percent improved to a relative productivity
between 0.3 and 0.6. This ﬁnding is consistent with the characterization of
deciles in the previous subsection.
The matrix in Table 4 focuses on the mobility for relative productivity in
our sample. In Table 5 we report an alternative mobility matrix constructed
by quintile. In this matrix, the ﬁrst element (0.78) represents the average
frequency with which countries in the bottom quintile of the relative income
distribution in a given year are also in the bottom quintile 20 years later. Note
that this second mobility matrix focuses on mobility for the relative position
of a country within the distribution. Therefore, unlike Table 4, this matrix
does not provide direct information on changes in the level of average relative
productivity of countries in a given bin.
The same basic patterns described for Table 4 also emerge in this second
mobility matrix. In particular, mobility is lower for countries in the bottom
and top quintiles than in the middle quintiles.
We can also characterize mobility by comparing the level of relative pro-
ductivityofcountriesin1960and1996. Figure5summarizesthisinformation.
In this ﬁgure, countries in the 45-degree line represent those in which produc-
tivity relative to that of the United States has not changed from 1960 to 1996.
Recall that for countries on the 45-degree line, labor productivity grew at
roughly2percentperyearduringthesampleperiod. Countriesabove(below)
the 45-degree line are those that have improved (deteriorated) their relative
productivity.208 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly


































































































































Relative Output per Worker (1960)
Figure 5 illustrates that individual countries have moved substantially in
the distribution of relative labor productivity during this period. Particularly
noticeable are the movements in relative productivity of countries such as
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Angola, and Venezuela.12
Finally, a summary statistic of the performance of individual countries
during the period from 1960 to 1996 is the annualized growth rate of output
per worker. Figure 6 shows that there are important differences in this growth
rate across countries.13 Output per worker in several countries deteriorated
relative to that in the United States. Countries that experienced this situation
werebothrichandpoorin1960. Relativerichcountriesthatobservednegative
performances include New Zealand, Switzerland, Venezuela, Canada, Swe-
den, the Netherlands, andArgentina. The most notorious negative performers
12 Using 1985 as the end year implies much less dispersion in relative productivity around
the 45-degree line. This fact suggests that there were substantial movements in relative productivity
between 1985 and 1996. Particularly noticeable are Thailand, China, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.
13 Growth rate differences are not systematically related to the level of relative productivity
in 1960. For a documentation of this ﬁnding, see, for instance, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996).M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 209
Figure 6 Growth in Output per Worker (1960–1996)


















































































































































Notes: The dotted-dashed line is the annualized growth rate of output per worker between
1960 and 1996 in the United States.
of the poor countries in 1960 are Angola, Central African Republic, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa, and Nicaragua, Peru, and Bolivia
in Latin America. We ﬁnd that in a surprisingly large number of countries,
such asVenezuela, Nicaragua, and manyAfrican countries, output per worker
fell in absolute terms from 1960 to 1996. The explanation for these disparate
growth experiences is a fundamental question for future research.14
A large number of countries gained position in the distribution of rel-
ative output per worker. These included relatively rich countries in 1960,
such as Ireland, Spain, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, and Norway, as well
as relatively poor countries, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan,
Botswana, Thailand, and Romania. Again, understanding the factors that ex-
plain these remarkable growth performances is of ﬁrst-order importance in
14 See some related work in Bello and Restuccia (2003); Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz
(2005); Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002); and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2006).210 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
development economics.15 We note, however, that there may be other rele-
vant growth experiences that are not captured by average growth because the
experiences begin later than 1960. For instance, China, Ireland, and India are
undergoing a miracle growth process that started later than 1960. In the next
section, we study systematically remarkable growth experiences in the data.
3. MIRACLESAND DISASTERS
Within the period between 1960 and 1996, there have been substantial move-
mentsofindividualcountriesovertimeinthedistributionofrelativeoutputper
worker. These movements are of interest because they provide opportunities
and challenges to theories of development. Our documentation thus far has
focused on countries with high and low annualized growth rates of output per
worker during the entire period from 1960 to 1996. However, the time series
ofindividualcountriesinoutputperworkershowepisodesofsubstantialposi-
tiveandnegativegrowthwithinthisperiod. Therefore, growthassummarized
by the growth rate in output per worker between 1960 and 1996 may hide
interesting growth episodes that occur within this period. For this reason, we
seek to systematically identify episodes of substantial and sustained growth
or decline in relative productivity during our sample period.
Foreachcountry, werecordamiracleordisasterepisodeiftrendedoutput
per worker in a country relative to that of the United States grows or declines
by more than 2 percent per year for at least 15 consecutive years. That is, a
miracle episode is one in which output per worker grows at about 4 percent
or more per year since trended output per worker in the United States grows
at roughly 2 percent per year. Similarly, a disaster episode is one in which
output per worker is stagnant or declines. Our view is that countries that are
lagging behind the technology frontier should be able to double the growth
rate of world knowledge in a miracle experience, while disaster experiences
wouldfeaturenogrowthordeclineinoutputperworkerforasustainedperiod
of time.
For each growth episode, we record the starting and ending years of the
episode, the relative output per worker in the starting and ending years, and
the implied annualized growth rate of relative output per worker during the
episode. Tables 6 and 7 report the countries for which the recorded growth
episodessatisfythetwoconditionsspeciﬁedaboveforamiracleandadisaster.
Notice that the changes in relative output reported in these tables focus only
on the period of substantial growth or decline. However, for many of these
countries, the process of growth or decline may have started earlier or con-
tinued later than reported but at lower rates. Moreover, many of the episodes
15 See, for instance, Duarte and Restuccia (2006).M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 211
Table 6 Miracle Episodes
Annualized Start Number Rel. Y/L
Country Growth (%) Year of Years Start End
Botswana 5.59 1965 26 0.07 0.30
Gabon 4.90 1960 15 0.21 0.42
Romania 4.80 1960 25 0.06 0.20
Taiwan 4.64 1960 36 0.12 0.63
Japan 4.56 1960 16 0.26 0.53
Hong Kong 4.54 1960 36 0.19 0.94
Greece 4.46 1960 15 0.34 0.66
Korea 4.20 1961 35 0.14 0.61
Singapore 4.10 1960 23 0.23 0.59
China 3.94 1978 18 0.04 0.08
Rep. of Congo 3.84 1960 24 0.04 0.10
Indonesia 3.62 1969 15 0.07 0.12
Thailand 3.39 1960 36 0.07 0.24
Notes: Annualized Growth is the growth rate in relative output per worker during the
episode. To obtain an approximate annualized growth rate in output per worker, add 2
percent from growth in output per worker in the United States. Rel. Y/L is relative
output per worker.
reported may be censored since the sustained process of growth or decline
may have started before 1960 or may have continued after 1996.
As expected, Table 6 is composed mostly of Asian countries, such as
Taiwan,Japan,HongKong,amongothers. Noticethatinsomeoftheepisodes
reported in this table, relative output per worker grew at an annualized rate
greater than 4 percent. Given the long time span of the experiences, these
countries improved their relative productivity dramatically. For instance, in
Botswana,relativeproductivityincreasedfrom7percentin1965to30percent
in 1991, and in Hong Kong, relative productivity increased by a factor of 5,
from 19 percent in 1960 to 94 percent in 1996. Note that, excluding Hong
Kong, these countries are still substantially below the level of U.S. labor
productivity at the end of their miracle episode.
The latest miracle episode reported inTable 6 is China. Since 1978, labor
productivity in China relative to that of the United States has grown at almost
4 percent per year, and by 1996, China doubled its relative productivity to
8 percent (see Figure 7, Panel A). However, this sustained period of growth
in productivity relative to that of the United States did not start until 1978;
before then, relative labor productivity was slightly declining or stagnant.
While China is undergoing a sustained period of growth, its growth perfor-
mance between 1978 and 1996 is not as remarkable as other miracle episodes,
suchasthatexperiencedbyBotswanaandHongKong, especiallyconsidering212 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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that China started its episode of growth by being only half as productive as
Botswana and 20 percent as productive as Hong Kong.
It is worth emphasizing that our deﬁnition of miracle episodes (of at least
15 years) rules out those episodes that started after 1982. For instance, Chile,
Ireland, and India had miracle experiences that started after 1982 and have
continued at least until 1996. In Chile, relative output per worker grew at an
averageof3.2percentstartingin1990(from32percentto40percentin1996).
In Ireland, relative output per worker grew at 3 percent starting in 1989 (from
63 percent to 81 percent in 1996), and in India, at 2.3 percent starting in 1992
(from 8 percent to 9 percent in 1996).
Table 7 reports the disaster experiences in our sample period. Note that
all countries in this table are located either in Africa or in Latin America. A
remarkablefeatureofthesedisasterexperiencesistheassociatedlargeandsus-
tained declines in relative output per worker, with some countries seeing their
relative output per worker fall by factors of 4 or more. While most countries
in this table were relatively unproductive at the onset of these experiences, the
Latin American countries were relatively productive. The most notable case
is Venezuela, where relative productivity fell from 87 percent in 1969 to 40M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 213
Table 7 Disaster Episodes
Annualized Start Number Rel. Y/L
Country Growth (%) Year of Years Start End
Dem. Rep. of Congo −6.45 1971 25 0.06 0.01
Mauritania −6.14 1977 19 0.14 0.04
Nicaragua −5.51 1974 22 0.33 0.10
Mali −5.06 1980 16 0.06 0.03
Mozambique −5.03 1971 16 0.08 0.03
Angola −4.82 1969 27 0.17 0.05
Peru −4.48 1977 19 0.39 0.16
Nigeria −3.99 1980 16 0.06 0.03
Central African Rep. −3.94 1973 23 0.09 0.04
Bolivia −3.93 1980 16 0.21 0.11
Zambia −3.74 1976 20 0.09 0.04
Venezuela −3.69 1968 21 0.87 0.40
Niger −3.23 1960 36 0.10 0.03
Ghana −3.09 1978 15 0.08 0.05
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire −3.06 1980 16 0.14 0.08
Chad −2.91 1980 16 0.07 0.05
Madagascar −2.72 1975 21 0.06 0.03
See notes in Table 6.
percent in 1989 (see Figure 7, Panel B).As in the case of miracles, a number
of disaster experiences started later than 1982 and therefore are not reported
inthistable. However, wenotethatcountriesinthisgroupincludeCameroon,
Rwanda, Kenya, Honduras, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, Senegal, and
SouthAfrica.
4. DEPRESSIONS
In this section, we report depressions in our data set following the character-
ization of Kehoe and Prescott (2002). A depression is deﬁned as a negative
deviationfromtrendinoutputperworkerthatisfast(leadingtoafallinoutput
per worker relative to trend of at least 15 percent within ten years) and large
(leading to a fall in output per worker relative to trend of at least 20 percent
during the depression period). For this section, we also follow Kehoe and
Prescott (2002) in deﬁning trend as the average annual growth rate of labor
productivity of the United States in the post-war period—about 2 percent. We
emphasize that to characterize depressions, we use the raw time series of out-
put per worker for each country relative to a trend growth of 2 percent. This
procedure differs from our characterization of miracle and disaster episodes
in the previous section, where we use trended data for each country relative
to that for the United States. Hence, depressions can be short- or medium-run214 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 8 Depressions—Europe and LatinAmerica
Year at (%) Lowest
Country 100 85 80 Level (%) Year
Denmark 1972 1980 1990 75 1992
the Netherlands 1976 1983 1992 75 1994
Switzerland 1972 1978 1983 61 1996
Argentina 1979 1982 1985 59 1990
Chile 1970 1975 1975 67 1983
Colombia 1989 1992 1992 71 1993
Costa Rica 1977 1981 1982 57 1996
Dominican Rep. 1980 1990 1990 77 1991
Ecuador 1979 1986 1987 66 1996
El Salvador 1977 1980 1980 58 1989
Guatemala 1979 1984 1986 70 1996
Jamaica 1970 1976 1976 48 1996
Mexico 1980 1986 1987 65 1995
Panama 1981 1987 1988 70 1989
Paraguay 1990 1994 1994 72 1994
Uruguay 1979 1983 1983 73 1985
Notes: Depressions are characterized using raw output per worker relative to a 2 percent
trend. The second to fourth columns report the approximate year the depression started,
the year in which output per worker relative to trend falls below 85 percent, and the
year in which output per worker relative to trend falls below 80 percent. The last two
columns report the level and year of the lowest output per worker relative to trend during
the depression episode.
episodes (closer to business cycles), while miracles and disasters are long-run
characterizations that abstract from business-cycle movements.
We ﬁnd that depressions are quite common, both among rich and poor
countries. Even in our relatively small sample period, we ﬁnd 53 depression
episodes. In Tables 8 and 9, we report 29 depressions in our panel data. We
exclude from these tables 24 depression episodes of countries that also faced
disaster episodes, as discussed in the previous section. We report the country
name and the approximate years in which the depression began, in which
output per worker fell below 85 percent (relative to its level in the starting
year), and in which output per worker fell below 80 percent (second to forth
columns). We also report the lowest level of output per worker relative to
trend and year during the depression period in the last two columns.
Table 8 summarizes the depression episodes of countries located in Eu-
rope and Latin America during our sample period. Depressions in Denmark,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland started in the 1970s, and during these ex-
periences, output per worker relative to trend fell by as much as 25 percent
in Denmark and the Netherlands and 39 percent in Switzerland. Many LatinM. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 215
Table 9 Depressions—Rest of the World
Year at (%) Lowest
Country 100 85 80 Level (%) Year
New Zealand 1973 1977 1979 59 1992
Benin 1964 1974 1975 74 1980
Congo 1984 1989 1989 57 1996
Ethiopia 1982 1985 1991 60 1992
Gabon 1977 1981 1982 62 1988
Gambia 1982 1990 1992 64 1996
Guinea 1960 1967 1968 64 1984
Iran 1975 1980 1980 55 1989
Jordan 1985 1989 1989 65 1991
Namibia 1978 1980 1980 52 1996
Papua New Guinea 1972 1980 1981 65 1990
Philippines 1980 1984 1985 62 1994
Togo 1980 1986 1987 50 1996
See notes in Table 8.
American economies experienced depressions in the 1970s and early 1980s
and saw declines of output per worker relative to trend of up to 50 percent.16
Table 9 summarizes the remaining depression experiences in our panel
data. WiththeexceptionofNewZealand,thesearerelativelypooreconomies.
However,thedepressioninNewZealandlooksremarkablysimilartotheother
episodes reported in this table. In particular, New Zealand has experienced a
long depression, starting around 1973, with a fall in output per worker relative
to trend as large as 41 percent in 1992.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our ﬁndings relative to (i) a measure of labor
productivitythatincludeshoursperworker,(ii)arestrictedsetofcountriesfor
which price data is collected to compute PPP-conversion factors (Benchmark
countries in PWT6.1), and (iii) a commonly used measure of income across
countries—output per capita.
Hours per Worker
We focused on output per worker as our measure of labor productivity across
countries. We chose this measure because of the lack of systematic data on
hours per worker for a large set of countries and time periods. However, there
16 Bergoeing et al. (2002) study the depression episodes of Mexico and Chile in the 1980s.216 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Output per Worker, Output per Hour, and Hours per Worker
(1996)
















































































































Notes: Output per worker from PWT6.1 is divided by (average) annual hours per worker
from GGDC (see Appendix). For this comparison, the data are not trended.
are data on hours per worker for some countries and some time periods. We
discuss the available evidence on hours per worker and how this evidence
may affect our ﬁndings about dispersion and mobility in labor productivity.
We combine the PWT6.1 data with the available data on hours per worker
from the Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre
(2006) to obtain output per hour.17 We report the two measures of relative
labor productivity for 1996 in Figure 8, PanelA.
In Figure 8, Panel A, countries on the 45-degree line represent those in
which hours per worker do not differ from the hours in the United States.
This is the case for most countries with some notable but perhaps well-known
exceptions. First,Europeancountriestendtohavelowerhoursperworkerthan
17 See the Appendix for a description of the data on hours per worker.M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 217
Figure 9 Changes in Hours per Worker












































































does the United States. In particular, output per worker tends to understate
labor productivity for these countries by roughly 10 percent.18 Second, there
are countries where hours per worker are higher than in the United States,
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Mexico, and Chile.
To illustrate the importance of differences in hours per worker more di-
rectly, we decompose output per hour as the product of output per worker
and the inverse of hours per worker. In Figure 8, Panel B, we plot hours per
worker relative to that of the United States across countries in 1996. Although
differences in hours per worker across countries are not too large, these differ-
ences are systematically related to income, with poorer countries observing
higherhoursperworkerthanrichercountries. Hence, dispersioninoutputper
worker actually understates dispersion in labor productivity (output per hour).
In Figure 9 we plot the ratio of hours per worker, 1996/1960, against the
level of hours per worker in 1960. This ﬁgure suggests that changes in hours
per worker during the 1960–1996 period are not related to the level of de-
velopment. Hence, our summary statistics of changes in dispersion in labor
18 For instance, Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2005) study the implication of tax differences
for labor supply levels in Europe and the United States.218 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
productivity over time are not affected by the exclusion of hours per worker.
It is worth emphasizing, though, that for some countries in the upper end of
the income distribution, changes in hours per worker are substantial. There-
fore, growth in output per worker may understate growth in labor productivity
for these countries (see some European countries, such as the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Norway, in Figure 9).
Benchmark Countries
The PWT6.1 uses detailed price data across countries to construct and price
a common international basket of goods. These international prices are then
used to convert aggregate measures of output in domestic prices to aggregate
measures of output in international prices that are comparable across coun-
tries. The factors of conversion are typically called purchasing power parity
(PPP). However, actual goods and services prices are collected for a subset
of countries (from the ICP studies), called Benchmark countries. Data for
the remaining countries are ﬁlled in using a variety of statistical techniques,
perhaps rendering PPP-converted data for these countries less reliable.
The most comprehensive and recent price collection was in 1996. We
restrict our sample to Benchmark countries in 1996 in order to assess the
importance of countries with lower quality data for our main ﬁndings on labor
productivity. Outof99countriesinoursample,67areBenchmarkcountriesin
1996.19 Werestrictourpaneldatatoonlythese67countriesandrecomputeour
baseline statistics. Our ﬁndings hold for the restricted sample. In particular,
we ﬁnd that there is a large disparity in relative productivity across countries
at any point in time in our sample, that disparity has increased since the mid-
1980s, andthattherehavebeensubstantialmovementsofindividualcountries
in the distribution of relative output per worker.
Output per Capita
We have focused our analysis on output per worker as opposed to output per
capita. Our motivation is that facts on output per worker relate more directly
to theories of labor productivity. Nevertheless, we recognize that measures of
output per capita are more widely available. For instance, Maddison (2001)
documents long time series of comparable measures of output per capita for
124 countries, while he offers only limited time series (at most 6 years) of
19 See the Appendix for the list of these countries.M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 219
Figure10 Changes in Productivity and Employment to Population



























































































































































output per worker for only 45 countries. Hence, it is of interest to docu-
ment how different our characterization of labor productivity across countries
would be if instead we use data on output per capita. Noticing that output
per capita can be decomposed as the product of output per worker and the
employment-to-population ratio, we can establish two main ﬁndings about
the relationship between output per worker and output per capita. First, while
there are substantial differences in the employment-to-population ratio across
countries, these differences are not systematically related to development.
Therefore, our summary statistics characterizing output per worker over time
are roughly similar to statistics on output per capita. Second, there are sub-
stantial changes in employment-to-population ratios for individual countries
over time, and these changes are not systematically related to development or
growth in relative productivity (see Figure 10). Therefore, changes in output
per capita can severely overstate or understate changes in labor productivity
for individual countries.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have documented three remarkable facts about the distribution of labor
productivity across countries: there is a large disparity in labor productivity220 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
across countries in the world, this disparity has increased substantially since
the mid-1980s, and there is substantial mobility of individual countries in the
distribution of labor productivity over time.
Substantial progress has been made by confronting theories of develop-
ment to facts. By extending and updating the development facts, we attempt
to provide new opportunities and challenges to theories of development. In
documenting a number of individual growth experiences, we intend to direct
research efforts to explore a number of relevant questions in development.
Why have China and India been able to start a miracle episode of growth in
the 1980s and 1990s but not other countries such as those in Latin America?
What accounts for China’s and India’s recent growth miracle? Why is labor
productivity inAfrica falling behind that of the United States since the 1980s
if it was catching up until then? Why is labor productivity in Latin America
stagnant or falling behind that of the United States? Why is labor productiv-
ity in Europe slowing down to levels below that of the United States? Why
has dispersion in relative labor productivity increased so much since the mid-
1980s? Isthereacommonfactorexplainingthisfactorisitrelatedtoavariety
of country-speciﬁc factors?
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
We use data from Penn World Tables V6.1 (see Heston, Summers, and Aten
2002) to construct annual time series of PPP-adjusted GDP per worker in
chained 1996 prices (variable RGDPWOK). We focus on countries that have
dataforeveryyearfrom1960to1996andthathaveatleastonemillioninpop-
ulationin1996. Theserestrictionsrenderasetof99countries, whichincludes
(with country code in parentheses): Angola (AGO), Argentina (ARG), Aus-
tralia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Burundi (BDI), Belgium (BEL), Benin (BEN),
Burkina Faso (BFA), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA),
Botswana (BWA), CentralAfrican Republic (CAF), Canada (CAN), Switzer-
land (CHE), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Cˆ ote d’Ivoire (CIV),
Cameroon (CMR), Republic of Congo (COG), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica
(CRI),Denmark(DNK),DominicanRepublic(DOM),Ecuador(ECU),Egypt
(EGY), Spain (ESP), Ethiopia (ETH), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Gabon
(GAB), United Kingdom (GBR), Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GIN), Gambia
(GMB), Guinea-Bissau (GNB), Greece (GRC), Guatemala (GTM), Hong
Kong(HKG),Honduras(HND),Indonesia(IDN),India(IND),Ireland(IRL),
Iran (IRN), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Jamaica (JAM), Jordan (JOR), Japan
(JPN), Kenya (KEN), Korea (KOR), Sri Lanka (LKA), Lesotho (LSO), Mo-
rocco (MAR), Madagascar (MGD), Mexico (MEX), Mali (MLI), Mozam-M. Duarte and D. Restuccia: Productivity of Nations 221
bique(MOZ),Mauritania(MRT),Mauritius(MUS),Malawi(MWI),Malaysia
(MYS), Namibia (NAM), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Nicaragua (NIC),
the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Nepal (NPL), New Zealand (NZL),
Pakistan (PAK), Panama (PAN), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Papua New
Guinea (PNG), Portugal (PRT), Paraguay (PRY), Romania (ROM), Rwanda
(RWA),Senegal(SEN),Singapore(SGP),ElSalvador(SLV),Sweden(SWE),




In Section 5 we use data on hours worked obtained from the Total Econ-
omy Database of the Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre (2006). We use data on annual hours worked per employee from
1960 to 1996 for the following 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Swe-
den, Turkey, Taiwan, United States, andVenezuela. We divide our measure of
output per worker from PWT by hours to obtain a measure of output per hour.
We make the implicit assumption that employees and self-employed people
work the same number of hours. Clearly self employment differs across sec-
tors and therefore countries; whether this assumption is valid or not is an open
question. ThereissomeevidencefromhouseholdsurveysintheUnitedStates
that employees and self-employed people work roughly the same amount of
hours.
The Benchmark 1996 countries in our data set are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada,
Switzerland, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, Gabon, United Kingdom, Guinea,
Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan,
Japan, Kenya, Korea, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Malawi, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pak-
istan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Singapore,
Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Tanzania, Uruguay,
United States, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.222 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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